

Causal Explanations for Sequential Decision Making Under Uncertainty

Extended Abstract

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1 INTRODUCTION

As autonomous decision making becomes ubiquitous, researchers agree that developing trust is required for adoption and proficient use of AI systems [20, 35, 39], and it is widely accepted that autonomous agents that can explain their decisions help promote trust [4, 10, 28]. However, there are many challenges in generating such explanations. Consider, for example, an autonomous vehicle (AV) stopped behind a truck. Passengers may wonder whether the AV is waiting for the truck to move, waiting for an opportunity to pass the truck, or dealing with some technical problem. Generating suitable explanations of such a system is hard due to the complexity of planning, which may involve large state spaces, stochastic actions, imperfect observations, and complicated objectives. Furthermore, useful explanations must somehow reduce the internal reasoning process to a form understandable by a non-expert user.

We introduce a novel framework (see also [31]) for causal explanations of stochastic, sequential decision-making systems built on the well-studied structural causal model (SCM) paradigm for causal reasoning [9]. Our unified framework can identify multiple, semantically distinct explanations of agent actions — something not previously possible. We establish exact methods and several approximation techniques for causal inference on Markov decision processes using this framework, followed by results on the applicability of the exact methods and some run-time bounds. We discuss scenarios that illustrate the framework’s flexibility and experiments with human subjects that confirm the benefits of this approach.

We operate on several established conclusions of philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists as to the purpose and logical mechanisms that underpin explanations [29, 30] — chiefly that requests for explanations are often motivated by a mismatch between the mental model of the requester and a logical conclusion

based on observation [11, 12, 14, 15, 22, 37], and that explanations often require counterfactual analysis [13, 21, 24, 25], which in turn requires causal determination [23, 34, 38]. There are several computational paradigms for causal analysis, including those based on conditional logic [8, 19], and statistics [7]. Among the most well-studied paradigms is the structural causal model [9].

Research on explanations of stochastic planners, such as MDPs, is relatively sparse, but there are several notable existing efforts. Elizalde et al. [6] identify important state factors by looking at how the value function would change were they to perturb that state factor’s value, and Khan et al. [17] present a technique to explain policies for factored MDPs by analyzing the expected occupancy frequency of states with extreme reward values. Similarly, Juozapaitis et al. [16] analyze how extreme reward values impact action selection in decomposed-reward RL agents. Wang et al. [36] try to explain policies of partially observable MDPs by communicating the relative likelihoods of different events or levels of belief.

Our framework, based on SCMs, applies causal analysis to sequential decision-making agents by creating an SCM representing the computation needed to derive a policy for a Markov decision process (MDP) and applying causal inference to identify variables that cause certain agent behavior, which can then be used to generate explanations. This framework provides two main benefits. First, it is theoretically sound, based on concepts and formalisms from the causality literature, while most existing approaches use heuristics. Second, it is flexible, allowing us to identify multiple types of explanans, whereas existing approaches often explain events in terms of a single set of variables in the decision-making model. For example, they may use *only* state factors or *only* reward variables, whereas we may use any set. Furthermore, we offer several approximate techniques for large problems or problems where the topology of the causal graph prevents exact inference. We conclude with results from a user study comparing the proposed method to existing, heuristic methods and we find statistically significant preferences in favor of explanations generated via causal reasoning.

2 STRUCTURAL CAUSAL MODELS FOR MDPS

We construct a causal model of the computation that solves for the policy of an MDP and then use this model to determine causes for agent actions. In the general case, this process follows four steps: (1) A causal graph is generated from the relevant MDP components, (2) The resulting graph is converted into a layered causal graph, (3) The layered graph is pruned to remove any irrelevant nodes and

Method	F	R	T	V	Causal?
Elizalde et al. (2009)	Yes	-	-	-	No
Russell and Santos (2019)	Yes	-	-	-	No
Khan et al. (2009)	-	Yes	-	-	No
Juozapaitis et al. (2019)	-	Yes	-	-	No
Betram et al. (2018)	-	Yes	-	-	No
Wang et al. (2016)	-	-	Yes	-	No
Madumal et al. (2020)	Yes	Yes	-	-	Yes
Proposed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 1: Comparison of method applicability

edges given the parameters of the causal query, and (4) A recursive algorithm identifies sets of causal variables in the graph. This provides a principled, general framework for causal inference on MDPs while simultaneously supporting several types of explanations.

Although it is possible to create a single, monolithic causal graph that simultaneously represents all components of the MDP tuple, this is not helpful since it does not afford any additional types of inference and is much less computationally efficient. Here, we give an example of an SCM constructed by only analyzing the state-factors of an MDP. In this work, we use the following definition of cause from Halpern and Pearl [9].

DEFINITION 1. Let $X \subseteq V$ be a subset of the endogenous variables, and let x be a specific assignment of values for those variables. Given an event ϕ , defined as a logical expression, for instance $\phi = (\neg a \wedge b)$, a weak cause of ϕ satisfies the following conditions:

- (1) Given the context $U = u$ and $X = x$, ϕ holds.
- (2) Some $W \subseteq (V \setminus X)$ and some \bar{x} and w exist such that:
 - A) using these values produces $\neg\phi$.
 - B) for all $W' \subseteq W$, $Z \subseteq V \setminus (X \cup W)$, where $w' = w|W'$ and $z = Z$ given $U = u$, ϕ holds when $X = x$.

Here, item 2 B) is saying that, given context $U = u$, $X = x$ alone is sufficient to cause ϕ , independent of some other variables W . If π_{sa} is a variable that is true when action a may be taken in state s , then in an MDP, a natural choice for ϕ is a subset of the variables π_{sa} . For example, if action a is taken in state s instead of a' , we have

$$\phi = \langle [\pi(s) = a], [\pi(s) = a'] \rangle = \langle \text{TRUE}, \text{FALSE} \rangle.$$

However, it is less clear how to define potential explanans, denoted by X . Intuitively, we often define X as being, for example, the set of all state factors, the set of all reward variables, or the set of all values for states h actions away. That is, we tend to define X according to some semantic type. The following example model can answer queries about the causality of state factors. Here, we let $\mathcal{U} = \emptyset$, and

$$\mathcal{V} = \pi_{sa} \cup s \cup f_i \quad \forall s \in S, \forall a \in A, \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$$

where f_i denotes the i th state factor. Finally, \mathcal{M} is composed of the following three sets.

$$\mathcal{M}_F := f_i = f_i^t, \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}.$$

Here f_i^t is the value of state factor i at time t . A given set of state factors $\langle f_1, \dots, f_n \rangle \in \mathcal{f}$ determines the state $s \in S$.

$$\mathcal{M}_S := [s = s_i] = [f_1 = f_1^i] \wedge \dots \wedge [f_n = f_n^i], \quad \forall s \in S.$$

Last, we have equations representing action selection.

$$\mathcal{M}_A := [\pi(s) = a] = \pi_{sa} \wedge s \quad \forall s \in S, a \in A.$$

Thus we define $\mathcal{M} := \mathcal{M}_F \cup \mathcal{M}_S \cup \mathcal{M}_A$. In general, this definition of SCMs for state factors permits exact inference regardless of the underlying MDP topology. Importantly, this causal model represents a *fixed* policy. While this model *cannot* change state factors to produce a different policy, it *can* understand how state factors affect action selection for a given policy.

3 RESULTS

Here we present results from an algorithm similar to that presented by Bertossi et al. (2020), based on the concept of responsibility from Chockler and Halpern (2004). This algorithm iterates directly through possible weak causal sets and then progressively checks larger sets W for assignments w that satisfy Def. 1. In addition to finding weak causal sets consistent with Def. 1, it also provides a ranking over causal sets. The purpose of this study is to show how (1) our approach can handle *semantically different* types of causal queries (see Table 1, not all modeled in this abstract), corresponding to different conceptions of MDP explanation in the literature, and (2) formal definitions of causality identify sensible explanans.

We identify 4 general types of explanation in the literature, each focusing on one component of the MDP tuple: *state factors* (F) [6, 33], *rewards* (R) [2, 16, 17], *transitions* (T) [36], and *future states and values* (V) [32]. These papers define metrics and algorithms particular to their type and lead us to define the following.

DEFINITION 2. *Y-type explanations use explanans $x \subset Y$. For example, F-type explanations use the set of state factors.*




Figure 1: Preference likelihoods of explanation methods. Color indicates the probability that explanations generated using the row-method are preferred to those generated by the column-method.

Here, we describe the results of a study investigating whether users tend to prefer explanations generated using causal reasoning over those generated using heuristics. In total, 189 participants aged 18-65 were shown simulated driving scenarios [18] where a car acts based on a policy from an MDP. After each action participants were shown automatically generated explanations and asked to rank them, producing preference ordering. The explanations included three baselines: [6] (F-type), [17] (R-type), and [36] T-type as well as all four types of explanation generated by our method. Every explanation was presented using the same basic template: "The car <took action> because <explanan 1>, ..., <explanan N>."

Figure 1 summarizes our findings: for every explanation type, users prefer the explanations generated via causal reasoning. We applied the Mann-Whitney U-test [27] to each pair of generation methods (21 in total), using an initial α -value of 0.5, and a Bonferroni-corrected [3] α -value of 0.0024. We detected the following preference ordering with p-values below 0.0001.

1) Prop-F \sim Prop-V $>$ Elizalde $>$ Prop-R \sim Prop-T $>$ Khan $>$ Wang
Here, $A > B$ denotes a strict preference for A over B, and \sim denotes preference equality. We believe the overall preference for causal explanations is due to their consistent relevance across all scenarios. Please see the full paper for more discussion and analysis [31].

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